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REPEATING THE FAILURES OF CARBON TRADING
Brittany A. Harris †
Abstract: Carbon emissions trading, or cap-and-trade, is increasingly in vogue
among Pacific Rim countries as a means of combating climate change. In theory, capand-trade promises to solve climate change by capping and gradually reducing the
amount of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions, and to do so with maximum
economic efficiency. In reality, environmentally effective and economically efficient
carbon emission trading systems have eluded both the international community and the
European Union, and in practice have arguably increased emissions by artificially
prolonging and legitimizing reliance on fossil fuels.
In spite of this poor track record, five countries on the Pacific Rim committed to
reducing their carbon dioxide emissions through domestic trading systems: Australia,
China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Although these countries’ commitment to
mitigating climate change is admirable, their domestic carbon emissions trading systems
are characterized by the very same features that rendered the Kyoto Protocol’s
international carbon market and the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme utterly
ineffective. These countries are consciously repeating the same mistakes and expecting
different results. Analyzing these five experiments, this comment identifies the features
that will likely undermine the environmental and efficiency goals of these systems. This
comment argues that due to these shortcomings, the emissions trading systems on the
Pacific Rim will not lower carbon dioxide emissions to safe levels—instead, they will
exacerbate climate change by artificially prolonging and legitimizing the use of fossil
fuels. In addition, the reappearance on the Pacific Rim of these unsound design features
lends credence to the theory that emissions trading is fundamentally unreliable as a
means of regulating and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea each
implemented emissions trading systems to reduce their domestic carbon
emissions and slow climate change. This is incredibly significant because
the Asian Pacific region has one of the highest aggregate greenhouse gas
emissions in the world, emitting 7.9 billion tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent (“tCO2e”) 1 a year in the mid-1990s. 2 By 2011, these five
countries generated 10,936.33 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
emissions from the consumption of energy alone, of which 8,715.31 million
†

Juris Doctor expected in 2014, University of Washington School of Law. The author is grateful to
Professor Melissa J. Durkee for her help in developing this comment, and thanks Michael J. Madderra and
Kate M. Mead of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their insightful comments and critiques.
1
tCO2e measures the equivalent carbon dioxide concentration that causes the same level of
absorption in the atmosphere for other greenhouse gases. Glossary: Carbon dioxide equivalent, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=C (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
2
Sixth compilation and synthesis of initial national communications from Parties not included in
Annex I to the Convention: Inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 8, Oct. 25, 2005,
FCCC/SBI/2005/18/Add.2, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/sbi/eng/18a02.pdf.
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metric tons originated in China3—the largest global emitter.4 Australia is the
world’s fifteenth largest emitter and emits more greenhouse gas per capita
than any developed nation; 5 Japan, despite its efficiencies and large
renewable energy sector,6 is the world’s fifth largest emitter of greenhouse
gases; 7 New Zealand contributes comparatively little to greenhouse gas
emissions globally, but it has the twelfth highest emissions per capita in the
developed world; 8 finally, South Korea is the world’s seventh largest
greenhouse gas emitter and one of the fastest growing emissions sources.9 If
these five countries successfully reduce their domestic emissions, their
collective efforts could drastically slow climate change and influence other
countries’ climate change policies.
These five countries, however, have elected to design and implement
carbon emissions trading systems. Despite the inability to develop an
environmentally effective and economically efficient carbon emissions
trading system in Europe10 or internationally through the Kyoto Protocol,11
3

International
Energy
Statistics,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=ww,r7,&syid=2006&e
yid=2011&unit=MMTCD (last visited Apr. 30, 2014). These figures include emissions from motor
vehicles and coal and gas power stations, but exclude emissions from other sources such as agriculture,
livestock, and deforestation. See id.
4
Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Increases Lead as Biggest Carbon Dioxide Emitter, N.Y. TIMES (June
14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/world/asia/14china.html?_r=0.
5
See Nick Evershed, Carbon Dioxide Emissions: How Does Australia Compare?, THE GUARDIAN
(July 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jul/16/australia-carbon-tax-emissions
(citing 2010 data compiled by the World Resources Institute).
6
See Joshua Meltzer, After Fukushima: What’s Next for Japan’s Energy and Climate Change
Policy?,
GLOBAL
ECON.
AND
DEV.
AT
BROOKINGS
2
(Sept.
7,
2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/07%20after%20fukushima%20meltzer/110
907_japaneseenergypolicy_final.pdf.
7
Chisaki Watanabe & Alex Morales, Japan Cuts Emissions Goal in Setback for Climate Talks,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/j apan-sets-new-emissionstarget-in-setback-to-un-treaty-talks.html.
8
MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/ frameworkemissions-trading-scheme-sep07/html/page2.html.
9
PETER SOPHER & ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING
ASS’N, SOUTH KOREA, THE WORLD’S CARBON MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 1
(May 2013), http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_korea_case
_study_may_2013.pdf.
10
European Climate Policy: Worse than Useless, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595002-current-policies-are-mess-heres-how-fix-them-worseuseless (observing that the European Union Emission Trading System does not incentivize emissions
reductions and is riddled with exceptions); Carbon Trading: ETS, RIP?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576388-failure-reform-europes-carbon-marketwill-reverberate-round-world-ets (critiquing the massive surplus and falling prices of permits in the EU
ETS and observing that even emissions trading proponents admit “[i]t may well become an example of
what not to do”); Stanley Reed, After Failed Attempt in April, Europe Approves Emissions Trading System,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/business/global/european-parliamentacts-to-support-emissions-trading-system.html (noting that despite backloading measures, “the number of
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cap-and-trade clearly remains a popular strategy. The five emissions trading
experiments on the Pacific Rim even share distinct features with the Kyoto
Protocol’s carbon market and the European Emissions Trading System (“EU
ETS”)—features that ultimately undermined the economic efficiency and
environmental effectiveness of these earlier systems.12 Because the same
characteristics that made emissions trading systems environmentally
ineffective in the past are reappearing in the present iterations on the Pacific
Rim, these experiments are unlikely to reduce emissions. Instead, they will
increase emissions by artificially prolonging and legitimizing the use of
fossil fuels. In addition, the persistence of these unsound design features
lends credibility to the argument that emissions trading systems are
intrinsically flawed in design or purpose.13 This suggests that if countries on
the Pacific Rim are committed to regulating and reducing their emissions,
emissions trading is not the solution.
Part II of this comment explains the significance of climate change
policy to these particular Pacific Rim countries, the previous international
efforts to address climate change through emissions targets, deadlines, and
emissions trading, the operation of an emissions trading system, and
criticisms of emissions trading systems. Part III analyzes the five emissions
trading systems developing along the Pacific Rim and identifies the design
features that will likely undercut their efficiency and limit their
effectiveness. In light of these shortcomings, Part IV concludes that these
emissions trading systems will not be effective at reducing greenhouse gases
and argues that countries dedicated to combating climate change should
explore more effective methods of regulating and reducing emissions.

allowances that will be held off the market, about 900 million, is estimated to be only about half of the
surplus of permits that would otherwise have built up by 2020”); Bryan Walsh, If Carbon Markets Can’t
Work in Europe, Can They Work Anywhere?, TIME (Apr. 17, 2013), http://science.time.com/
2013/04/17/if-carbon-markets-cant-work-in-europe-can-they-work-anywhere/ (arguing that the EU ETS is
not an effective environmental policy).
11
See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 73 (Mar. 2013) (quoting Sungjoon
Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 491, 497-98 (2012)) (explaining that international climate change treaties are difficult because
“negotiators are alert to changing global circumstances and are loath to eliminate their future flexibility by
making concrete commitments; treaties are often accompanied by reservations and other party-specific
caveats that minimize the treaty’s effectiveness; and the treaty amendment process is ‘tortuous,’ such that
treaties cannot adapt quickly to rapidly evolving global regulatory needs.”); Quirin Schiermeier, The Kyoto
Protocol: Hot Air, NATURE (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news/the-kyoto-protocol-hot-air1.11882 (noting “the reductions made under the treaty were dwarfed by the rise in emissions not covered
by the accord, especially in Asia,” and that “[t]he treaty . . . was based on ‘dubious economic assumptions
and flawed accounting systems’”).
12
See infra Parts II.C, III.B.
13
See infra Parts II.C, III.
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THE RISE OF EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS

Regulating and reducing carbon dioxide emissions is an important
objective internationally because A) carbon emissions are the primary cause
of climate change,14 the effects of which are already being felt in countries
along the Pacific Rim. Initially expressed as mere targets and deadlines,
B) international efforts to regulate carbon emissions are predominately
market mechanisms such as emissions trading systems, rather than top-down
regulatory schemes. Accordingly, countries along the Pacific Rim elected
emissions trading systems as the preferred method of regulating carbon
emissions. Rather than enforce specific emissions standards through civil or
criminal sanctions, C) these systems are flexible, decentralized, and provide
market incentives for reducing carbon emissions. However, D) the ability of
such systems to actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions has been the
subject of much criticism following the Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS.
A.

To Reverse Climate Change, Countries Must Regulate its Primary
Cause—Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Humans are radically altering the chemical composition of the globe
by burning hydrocarbons. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere surpassed pre-industrial values and is increasing steadily due to
heavy reliance on fossil fuels.15 In 2011, atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide reached 391 parts per million, a level unprecedented in the
last 800,000 years.16 Carbon dioxide absorbs sunlight that is reflected back
towards space as infrared radiation; rather than escape Earth’s atmosphere, it
converts into heat.17 The rise in global average temperatures since the midtwentieth century is “extremely likely” due to the high concentrations of
anthropogenic18 greenhouse gas—primarily carbon dioxide.19
Beyond increasing the average global temperature, increased carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere profoundly alter the planet’s
physical and biological systems. Increased carbon dioxide concentrations
14

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at 13 (Thomas F. Stocker et al., 2013),
available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.
15
Id. at 11.
16
Id.
17
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., GREENHOUSE GASES, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND ENERGY, (Apr. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html.
18
Meaning “resulting from the influence of human beings on nature.” Anthropogenic, MERRIAM
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropogenic (last visited May 10, 2014).
19
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 14, at 17.
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have very likely contributed to sea-level rise during the late twentieth
century.20 Likewise, carbon emissions have altered wind patterns and extratropical storm tracks, exacerbated temperature extremes, and heightened risk
of heat waves and frequency of heavy precipitation events.21 Increased
carbon dioxide concentrations warm and acidify the ocean,22 which in turn
negatively impacts marine life, particularly shell forming organisms, corals,
and their dependent species.23 Some impacts may be irreversible. For
example, the loss of Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets may result in rising
sea levels, major changes in coastlines, inundations of low-lying areas, and
loss of habitat for arctic species. 24 Absent “substantial and sustained
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions,” changes in the global climate
system will escalate during the twenty-first century.25

20

Id. at 19 (concluding that “[i]t is very likely that there is a substantial anthropogenic contribution
to the global mean sea level rise . . . based on the high confidence in an anthropogenic influence on the two
largest contributions to sea level rise, that is thermal expansion and glacier mass loss”).
21
See Thomas F. Stocker et al., 2013: Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 33, 72-73, 109-13 (Thomas F. Stocker et al., eds.,
2013), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf; New
Analyses Find Evidence of Human-caused Climate Change in Half of the 12 Extreme Weather and Climate
Events Analyzed from 2010, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2013/20130905-extremeweatherandclimateevents.html
(citing
Thomas C. Peterson, Explaining Extreme Events of 2012 from a Climate Perspective, 94 BULLETIN OF THE
AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y S1 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.ametsoc.org/2012extremeevents
climate.pdf) (explaining that human-induced climate change increased the probability and exacerbated the
impact of extreme events in the United States in 2012, such as heat waves, drought, and storm surge and
coastal inundation from Hurricane Sandy); John P. Holdren, Drought and Global Climate Change: An
Analysis of Statements by Roger Pielke Jr. (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/critique_of_pielke_jr_statements_on_drought.pdf
(summarizing
the
mainstream views of the climate-science community on the relationship between climate change and the
frequency, duration, and severity of drought in the western United States); Wyatt Andrews, NOAA Links
Extreme Weather to Climate Change, CBS NEWS (July 10, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/830118563_162-57469878/noaa-links-extreme-weather-to-climate-change (explaining that the 2011 record
drought in Texas was made twenty times more likely by man-made warming and could not be explained by
the natural variability of natural phenomenon alone. That year, there were seven tornado outbreaks and
increased hurricanes in North America, unprecedented flooding in Australia, and widespread drought in
east Africa—all caused by the warmest La Niña in history.).
22
Stocker et al., supra note 21, at 295, 297.
23
See NAT’L CTRS. FOR COASTAL OCEAN SCI., NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Ocean
Acidification Promotes Disruptive and Harmful Algal Blooms on Our Coasts (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://coastalscience.noaa.gov/news/climate/ocean-acidification-promotes-disruptive-and-harmful-algalblooms-on-our-coasts/; Stephanie Pappas, More Bad Global Warming News: Acidification Harming Sea
Urchins, NBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/more-bad-globalwarming-news-acidification-harming-sea-urchins-f2D11624175 (explaining that acidification interferes
with the ability of keystone species, such as green sea urchins, to digest, and has a harmful effect on
calcification—the process marine animals use to build shells or skeletons with minerals from the water).
24
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 14, at 9, 11, 25-26, 70-72, 323.
25
Id. at 19.
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Climate change will profoundly affect countries along the Pacific Rim
in the twenty-first century.26 In East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and
Australia, an increase in precipitation extremes related to the monsoon
systems and cyclones is very likely.27 In East Asia and parts of Australia,
heatwaves will likely increase in frequency, duration, and severity.28 In
Australia, there is a risk of widespread and permanent damage to coral reef
systems, species extinction, more frequent flooding and damage to key
infrastructure, inundation of low-lying areas from rising sea levels, and a
significant drop in agricultural production.29 East, Southeast, and South Asia
could face some of the worst effects of global warming: heat stress, extreme
precipitation, flooding, drought, and water scarcity.30
B.

Countries Adopted Market-based Mechanisms to Reach International
Targets and Deadlines for Reducing Emissions

To counteract climate change, a number of countries committed to
targets and deadlines to reduce their domestic carbon dioxide emissions.
The first climate treaty at Rio de Janeiro led to the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), which is the
basis for all subsequent climate change negotiations.31 To date, 189 nations
have ratified this convention. 32 This agreement formalized the goal of
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at safe levels, the principles of
precaution, cost-effectiveness, and common but differentiated
responsibilities, the obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions and
national measures to combat climate change, and the commitment for
assistance and technology transfer to developing countries.33 UNFCCC is
limited because it is legally non-binding and contains no qualitative limits or

26

See Stocker et al., supra note 21, at 106, 109-13, 135.
Id. at 105-07, 1270, 1287.
28
Id. at 162, 1270.
29
Jeanavive McGregor & Jake Sturmer, UN Climate Change Report Card: Scientists Predict
Australia Will Continue to Get Hotter, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-0323/ipcc-working-group-ii-report-climate-change-australia/5339654.
30
Robin McKie, Global Warming to Hit Asia Hardest, Warns New Report on Climate Change, THE
OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/22/global-warming-hitasia-hardest.
31
SCOTT D. DEATHERAGE, CARBON TRADING LAW AND PRACTICE 22 (2011).
32
DANIEL BODANSKY & SOPHIE CHOU, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 1 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.c2es.orgwww.c2es.org/docUploads/2012%20new.pdf.
33
Id.; see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UFCCC].
27
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enforcement mechanisms. 34 However, it operates as a framework for
negotiating binding limits among nations.35
Convention parties incorporated cap-and-trade concepts in the first
agreement negotiated under UNFCCC: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, developed countries voluntarily agreed to reduce their
domestic emissions to five percent below 1990 levels by the end of the first
compliance period (2008 to 2012) through national greenhouse gas
emissions reduction programs. 36 The Kyoto Protocol introduced three
market-based mechanisms: Joint Implementation (“JI”), the Clean
Development Mechanism (“CDM”), and international emissions trading.37
Under JI, countries with emissions reduction commitments earn emission
reduction units (“ERUs”) towards their target from emission reduction or
emission removal projects in countries with emissions reduction
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 38 Under the CDM, developed
countries may elect to meet their targets by initiating emissions reduction
projects in developing countries that have no reduction commitments.39 A
key condition is “additionality”: CDM projects must lead to emissions
reductions “beyond business as usual,” or beyond what would have been
achieved without the incentive to earn ERUs.40 Finally, parties to the Kyoto
Protocol that reduce their emissions below their target levels earn excess
credits that may be sold to countries that are over their targets.41 These
mechanisms created an international carbon market.
Near the end of the first compliance period, countries convened in
Durban, South Africa, and Doha, Qatar, to negotiate the terms of a second
34

See Harro van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and the Role of
Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 319 (2009).
35
See DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 41-42, 46-48.
36
See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Developing countries, such as China, had no limits.
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 22.
37
The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development
Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited May 10, 2014).
38
Joint Implementation (JI), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php (last visited May 10,
2014).
39
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/
2718.php (last visited May 10, 2014); DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 22-23.
40
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 23.
41
International Emissions Trading, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last visited May
10, 2014).
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compliance period under the Kyoto Protocol.42 Parties agreed to extend the
protocol through 2020, but the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters,
China and the United States, refused to adopt mandatory and quantitative
emissions reduction targets. 43 Japan and New Zealand declined to
participate in a second compliance period.44 Without going into the merits
of emissions trading systems, this extension of the Kyoto Protocol will likely
be insufficient to counteract climate change given the number of large
emitters not participating and the obsolete targets and baseline standards
contemplated by the new protocol.45
Although the Kyoto Protocol had a negligible environmental impact,46
in part because the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases refused to
adopt binding emissions reductions, 47 it was tremendously successful at
promoting market mechanisms as a method of regulating greenhouse gas
emissions. The EU ETS, launched in 2005, was the first international
mandatory cap-and-trade system.48 It was designed to help member states
42

Durban, Towards Full Implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/
6825.php; The Doha Climate Gateway, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php.
43
Doha Outcome: Kyoto Protocol Lives, Global Climate Deal by 2015, ENVIRONMENT NEWS, (Dec.
8, 2012), http://ens-newswire.com/2012/12/08/doha-outcome-kyoto-protocol-lives-global-climate-deal-by2015/.
44
Matrin Khor, A ‘Low Ambition’ Outcome in Doha, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Jan/Feb 2013),
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2013/269-270/cover01.htm (noting that original Kyoto
Protocol parties Russia, Japan, and New Zealand decided not to join a second commitment period, and
Canada dropped out of the protocol entirely).
45
Id. (pointing out that the emissions cuts to which countries agreed are in aggregate only 18%
below the 1990 level by 2020, compared with the 25-40% reduction required to restrict global temperature
rise to two degrees Celsius); David Hodgkinson, Doha climate talks: time for an alternative approach,
EAST ASIA FORUM (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/24/doha-climate-talks-time-foran-alternative-approach/ (observing that at Doha, “not ‘a single new pledge to cut pollution from a major
emitter’ was made,” and questioning “whether the UN system provided ‘cover for leaders to take no
meaningful action’”).
46
Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact From Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 557,
559 (2009).
47
The United States and China, the two largest contributors to global warming, have not agreed to
binding, quantitative emissions reductions. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade,
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11, 17-18 (2009) (noting that the United States initially used its influence to
exclude mandatory emissions reductions from the UNFCCC, and later refused to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol); Jason J. Czarnezki, Climate Policy & U.S. China Relations, 12 VT. J. ENVT’L. L. 659, 666 (2011)
(noting that China signed the Kyoto Protocol but, like other developing countries, only agreed to mitigation
measures, not quantitative emissions reductions); Lost in Translation, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (July
28, 2009), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2009/07/28/lost-in-translation/ (explaining that China
historically denied responsibility for emissions, and quoting Minister Xie Zhenhua as stating that “[t]he
primary responsibility for talking climate change should rest with the developed countries”).
48
EU ETS 2005-2012, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/
index_en.htm (last visited May 10, 2014).
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meet their emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.49 Likewise,
the emissions trading systems in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were
initially adopted to help meet Kyoto Protocol targets and designed to link
with the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol’s international carbon market.50
Apart from committing to targets and deadlines under the Kyoto
Protocol, many countries made international commitments to reduce or limit
their domestic emissions by the year 2020 under the Copenhagen Accord.51
These targets vary—for example, the targets for Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea, and formerly Japan are expressed as a percentage reduction in
emissions relative to the level of emissions in a base year—a base year that
varies from 1990 for Japan and New Zealand to 2000 for Australia. 52
Commitments for China are expressed as a reduction in emissions intensity,
or emissions per unit of GDP, against the base year of 2005.53
Country
Australia
China

49

Commitment to Limit Emissions by 2020 Relative to Various Base
54
Years
5-25% below 2000 levels. Moving above five percent is contingent on
global, comprehensive agreement.
40-45% below 2005 emissions intensity levels.
Increase the
proportion of non-fossil fuels used in primary energy consumption to
15% and increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest
stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters relative to 2005.

Id.
See Australia National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) s 3(Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00521 (objects: to meet international reporting requirements);
Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.) available at http://www.comlaw.gov/au/Details/C2013C00372
(objectives: to give effect to Australia’s obligations under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto
Protocol); Climate Change Response Act 2002 s 3 (NZ) available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/
act/public/2002/0040/latest/DLM158590.html (aiming to enable New Zealand to meet its international
obligations under the Convention and the Protocol); see generally GLOBAL WARMING PREVENTION
HEADQUARTER, KYOTO PROTOCOL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT PLAN (2005) (Japan), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/kyoto/050428plan_e.pdf (describing
the global warming
countermeasures, including a voluntary emissions trading system, designed to achieve Japan’s promise
under the Kyoto Protocol).
51
Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, 15th Sess., Dec. 7-Dec. 19 2009, U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
52
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, CARBON EMISSION POLICIES IN KEY ECONOMIES,
(May 2011) 16-17, http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/109830/carbon-prices.pdf.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 17. This table from the Australian Government Productivity Commission is based on the
calculations of McKibbin, Morris, and Wilcoxen (2010), who attempted to convert the Copenhagen targets
to equivalent targets with common base years. Id. These authors found that varying the base years affects
the apparent stringency of these targets. For example, Australia’s commitment to an unconditional
emissions reduction of five percent below 2000 levels is equivalent to each of the following: a 30%
increase in emissions relative to 1990 levels, a 18% reduction relative to 2005 levels, and a 35% reduction
relative to business as usual levels in 2020. Id.
50
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25% below 1990 levels, contingent on all major economies joining a
fair and effective international framework with ambitious targets.
10-20% below 1990 levels, contingent on global, comprehensive
agreement.
30% below business as usual levels.55

All five countries implemented emissions trading systems to help meet these
2020 targets. The figures above demonstrate that Japan committed to the
largest reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (48%) and Australia’s
commitment is in line with that of Europe (36%) and the United States
(33%), whereas China’s commitment is smaller (22%). 56 Yet Japan
abandoned its Copenhagen commitments in November 2013, explaining that
the Fukushima meltdown caused Japan to reevaluate its nuclear energy
programs and that consequently a 25% reduction from 1990 levels is
“unfeasible.”57 Japan’s revised climate goal is a three percent increase in
greenhouse gas emissions above 1990 levels.58
C.

Elements of an Emissions Trading System

Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea selected
emissions trading systems as the preferred method of regulating carbon
emissions and meeting their Copenhagen or future Kyoto Protocol targets.
Unlike a command-and-control regime, in which a government enforces
specific emissions standards through civil or criminal sanctions,59 marketbased mechanisms such as emissions trading systems are, in theory, flexible
and decentralized.60 Private project developers and capital investors, rather
than state or national governments, identify and implement carbon reduction
projects. 61 Emissions trading systems give regulated parties financial
incentives to curb emissions through efficiency and innovation, either

55

“Business as usual levels” refer to the projected level of greenhouse gas emissions assuming no
reduction or mitigation measures are taken. Unlike historical emissions data for a baseline year such as
1990, which is fixed, the projected level of emissions in 2020 may be higher or lower than the actual level
of emissions. Therefore, it may be misleading to equate meeting such targets with actual reductions in
emissions—it depends on how close the projected and actual levels of emissions are.
56
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 17-18.
57
Sarah Lazare, Slap in the Face: Japan Uses Fukushima Nuclear Disaster to Ditch Carbon Targets,
COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/11/15-2.
58
Id.
59
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 16-17.
60
Id. at 17-18 (reflecting “the need in the climate change context to make millions of decisions about
taking actions in millions of places all over the world, or even at the state or national level”).
61
Id.
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because they want to avoid fines for exceeding allowable emissions or
because pollution reductions generate financial assets that they can sell.62
An important feature of an emissions trading system is the cap. After
the government determines what industries or facilities are liable for specific
emissions, it sets an overall emissions target, an absolute cap, which is the
sum of all allowable emissions from liable facilities.63 Total emissions may
not exceed this cap, which decreases over time.64 Although the price of
emissions fluctuates with the market for tradable allowances, the absolute
amount of emissions into the atmosphere is theoretically controllable.65
Tradable allowances, or emission credits, are rights to pollute that are
either auctioned or allocated freely from the government to liable entities.66
These allowances authorize the release of a specified amount of greenhouse
gas emissions, typically one allowance per tCO2e.67 Emitters may comply
with emissions reductions by actually reducing their emissions or by
purchasing allowances from a more efficient party that has reduced its own
emissions more than required.68 Additionally, such systems typically allow
pollution “offsets,” meaning that emissions reductions from activities that
are not regulated can be used to meet the reductions required in activities
that are regulated.69
At this point, one major shortcoming of emissions trading systems is
clear: such systems are designed to regulate emissions from discrete and
typically fixed sources, such as fossil-fuel-based power generation
facilities.70 This design makes sense because it is simpler to verify and
monitor emissions from large, discernible, and fixed sources. However, it
means that these systems are maladapted to regulate the smaller or diffuse
sources of carbon emissions, such as private transportation, livestock, and

62

See id. at 19.
Id.
64
Id. at 19-20.
65
Brian C. Murray et al., Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve for Capand-Trade, 3 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 84, 87 (2009).
66
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 19.
67
Id. For example, “assigned amount units” and other trading units in the Kyoto Protocol carbon
market are each equal to one ton of CO2. International Emissions Trading, supra note 41.
68
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 19.
69
Id.
70
One of the first cap-and-trade systems, the U.S. Acid Rain Program, was designed to regulate a
total of 445 coal-burning electric utility plants in the U.S. Acid Rain Program, UNITED STATES ENVT’L
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).
Environmentalist and carbon-intensive industries alike cite to the U.S. Acid Rain Program as a primary
prototype. Koushik Ghosh & Peter Gray, Rushing to Copenhagen? Is Cap-and-Trade the Answer?, 53
CHALLENGE 5, 13 (2010).
63
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agriculture, which also contribute significantly to climate change.71 The
shortcomings of emissions trading systems will be explored in Part III, using
the recent cap-and-trade experiments in Pacific Rim countries as examples.
The next section identifies the major criticisms of emissions trading.
D.

Criticisms of Emissions Trading Systems

Emissions trading systems have come under a myriad of criticisms.
The most frequently voiced concern is the immense hurdles to their
implementation. Despite their alleged “efficiency,” such systems conceal a
number of inefficiencies in that they require an enormous amount of legal,
institutional, and technological preparation apart from their high
administrative costs.72 The integrity of emissions trading systems depends
upon accurate monitoring, reporting, and verification of emissions.
Unfortunately, direct pollution measurement and monitoring systems for
greenhouse gases have large margins of error.73 Historical emissions data is
typically provided by the regulated emitters themselves; many countries
currently implementing emissions trading systems have weak environmental
enforcement systems and lack far-reaching, uniform, and accurate systems
for measurement and monitoring.74 Further, emissions trading systems are
premised on the belief that emitters should internalize the cost of damage
from climate change, yet calculating the monetary costs and benefits of
pollution with the exactitude required by economic theory is impossible.75
These barriers to adoption, implementation, and enforcement inevitably
delay emissions reductions and undermine the efficiency claims of emissions
trading proponents.76
71

See, e.g., Transportation and Climate, UNITED STATES ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/basicinfo.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2014) (explaining that in 2011,
transportation represented approximately 27% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and over half of the
net increase in total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2011); MINISTRY OF BUS., INNOVATION &
EMP’T, ENERGY GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2012) http://www.med.govt.nz/sectors-industries
/energy/energy-modelling/publications/energy-greenhouse-gas-emissions/energy-greenhouse-gasemissions.pdf (last visited May 8, 2014) (stating that emissions from transport make up 43% of total
emissions in New Zealand’s energy sector); see also supra Part III.A.
72
Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading—A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization, and
Power, 48 DEVELOPMENT DIALOG 1, 72, 102 (2006).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Clive L. Splash & Alex Y. Lo, Australia’s Carbon Tax: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 23 ECON. &
LABOUR RELATIONS REV. 67, 69 (2012) (arguing that attempts to calculate the monetary costs and benefits
of human induced climate change “merely result[s] in rhetoric and conjecture”).
76
Jason Scott Johnston, Problems of Equity and Efficiency in the Design of International
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Schemes, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 405, 405-06 (2009) (arguing on the
basis of evidence from the European Union’s experience that cap-and-trade suffers from inherent problems
of enforceability and verifiability, which cause significant inefficiencies).
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Critics also argue that emissions trading systems may prolong the use
of fossil fuels. Businesses and political leaders predictably want more fossil
fuel and less climate change;77 emissions trading systems are premised on
society’s continued reliance on fossil fuels. Under such a scheme, regulated
entities only reduce carbon emissions when it is profitable 78 —when
emissions allowances are over-allocated, such a system actually subsidizes
emitters and prolongs reliance on fossil fuels.79 Consumers bear the cost of
emissions reductions.80 Governments that adopt these systems assume that
market forces will fix climate change by causing consumers and profit
seeking firms to invest in efficient technological solutions over emissionsintensive energy generation and products.81 Critics, however, doubt that
pricing mechanisms can prompt the radical innovation and wholesale
reorganization of our technological and economic structures that are
necessary to halt climate change. 82 With political will directed at
experimental technology and market fixes to climate change, policymakers
can subordinate alternatives that entail substantial and systemic changes.83
Critics worry that the true effect of emissions trading is to reward the
77

Lohmann, supra note 72, at 23.
Jane Andrew et al., Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate Change, 21
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAXATION 611, 616 (2010) (explaining “[i]t would be possible for a firm to
financially benefit from participating in an ETS by keeping business as usual as long as other firms were
making reductions to pollution. . . A firm need not actually reduce carbon pollution in order to trade in an
ETS. Similarly, a firm may choose to pay a tax on its carbon pollution rather than incur capital expenditure
to implement innovations to reduce pollution. In an ETS the risk of not achieving carbon reduction will
rest entirely with the government and its use of the relevant science to determine the necessary cap upon
the collective carbon pollution of industry and government’s monitoring of carbon offsets.”).
79
Dave Keating, Energy Intensive Industries Benefiting from ETS, Says Commission,
EUROPEANVOICE (May 16, 2013), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/may/energy-intensiveindustries-benefitting-from-ets-says-commission/77280.aspx (observing that due to the surplus of
emissions allowances that plagued the EU ETS since its inception, the emissions trading system “has been
a financial support to the energy intensive industries . . . who usually complain that the ETS is killing
them”).
80
Andrew et al., supra note 78 (observing that in emissions trading, “the responsibility for pollution
is not placed with the polluter, and there need not be a direct link with carbon mitigation . . . That is, the
responsibility of carbon emissions can bypass the polluter and be passed onto the consumer. Accordingly:
‘[a]n emissions trading scheme will see the price of electricity and manufactured goods go up but that is no
guarantee that the market will invest in alternatives, especially if polluters can pass on the extra cost to
consumers, buy up environmentally dubious permits, or be compensated for extra costs that might damage
their international competitiveness.’”).
81
Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 71.
82
Id. See also Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows, A New Paradigm for Climate Change, 1 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 639, 639 (2012) (adding that academics “have contributed to a misguided belief that
commitments to avoid warming of 2o Celsius can still be realized with incremental adjustments to
economic incentives”).
83
For example, ceasing the extraction of fossil fuels from the ground, commencing large-scale
public works to reduce society’s fossil fuel dependency, shifting subsidies for fossil fuel exploration,
extraction, refining, transport, and use to renewable energies, implementing green taxes, and adopting
conventional pollution regulation. Lohmann, supra note 72, at 330-31.
78
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heaviest polluters by taking taxation and conventional regulation off the
table while generating new sources of profit for polluters.84 This ensures
continued investment in fossil-fuel based technologies and disadvantages
industries that might investigate alternative energy.85 Tellingly, the fossil
fuel industry does lobby heavily for emissions trading when it would
forestall an alternative, more costly form of regulation: an emissions tax.86
Finally, critics contend that emissions trading systems do not reduce
emissions. Although emissions trading systems have overall emissions caps
that decrease over time, regulated parties may simply buy permits rather
than reduce their emissions.87 If they cannot purchase surplus permits, then
they can generate credits from offsets by investing in carbon-saving and
carbon-sequestering projects—the climate effectiveness of which is highly
uncertain.88 Or they can use their influence over the allocation process to
secure a larger quantity of freely allocated permits.89 Emissions trading
systems appear highly susceptible to rent-seeking, lobbying for special
exemptions, and gaming through financial markets.90 Lastly, domestic and
international fairness issues suggest that it will be years before meaningful
international emission limits are adopted, let alone enforced. 91
These criticisms, based on the failures of carbon trading under the
Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS, are relevant to the experiments currently being
undertaken along the Pacific Rim. As explored below in Part III, the same
hurdles to implementation and limited effectiveness plague the systems in
Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. This supports the
84

Id. at 34, 50.
Tamra Gilbertson & Oscar Reyes, Carbon Trading: How it Works and Why it Fails, 7 CRITICAL
CURRENTS 1, 31 (2009).
86
David G. Victor & Joshua C. House, BP’s Emissions Trading System, 34 ENERGY POLICY 2100,
2101 (2006); see also Lohmann, supra note 72 (arguing that while companies will have to make reductions
or pay up if emissions caps are tightened, “emissions trading encourages [companies] to treat global
warming not as a social and environmental problem to be solved but as a business and public relations
problem . . . to be managed at the least possible relative financial and market loss to themselves. And it
gives them the means to make sure caps are not tightened very much or very swiftly. Far-sighted
companies treat the carbon trading as an opportunity to gain new property rights, assets and openings for
capital accumulation, even if climate change is accelerated in the process.” (italics in original)).
87
See Lohmann, supra note 72, at 106; Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 616.
88
Lohmann, supra note 72, at 137-139 (noting that it is difficult to measure the carbon stored);
Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 447 (2007)
(observing that the capacity of carbon sinks such as forests, soil, and ocean cannot possibly keep up with
rising carbon emissions).
89
Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 35; see also Alan D. Viard, The Cap-and-Trade Giveaway,
THE AMERICAN (June 26, 2009), http://www.american.com/archive/2009/june/the-cap-and-trade-giveaway
(arguing that free allocation provides windfall gains to stockholders without restraining energy prices for
consumers, and comparing a cap-and-trade system with freely allocated permits to a carbon tax in which
the tax revenue is given to stockholders).
90
Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 13.
91
Id. at 13-14; DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 48.
85
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theory that the problems pervading emissions trading systems are not subject
to correction through experience, but are inherent to the system itself.
III.

PACIFIC RIM EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS WILL BE INEFFICIENT,
INEFFECTIVE, AND ULTIMATELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE

To regulate their domestic greenhouse gas emissions, particularly
carbon dioxide emissions, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South
Korea are experimenting with emissions trading systems. Most of these
countries initially implemented such systems to meet targets and deadlines
under the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Copenhagen Accord.92 These
countries’ decisions to mitigate climate change are admirable. However,
these systems have many features in common with the Kyoto Protocol
carbon market and the EU ETS—features that rendered those systems
inefficient and ineffective. Therefore, emissions trading on the Pacific Rim
A) undermines claims that emissions trading systems are an efficient form of
regulation, and B) will likely fail to reduce emissions to safe levels, lending
weight to the theory that emissions trading systems are inherently flawed.
A.

Pacific Rim Countries Have Incurred Substantial Implementation and
Administrative Costs, Negating Efficiency Claims

As explained in Part II.D, countries face two primary hurdles to
implementing emissions trading systems that undermine their economic
efficiency claims and, to an extent, their environmental effectiveness. These
are: 1) the substantial legal, institutional, and technological investment
necessary to develop two distinct but interrelated regulatory systems, and
2) the necessity of designing accurate mechanisms to measure, report, and
verify emissions from a variety of sources, often in the context of a dearth of
emissions data or lack of enforcement capacity. Both hurdles accompany
the current emissions trading experiments along the Pacific Rim.
1.

Emissions Trading Experiments on the Pacific Rim Require
Substantial Legal, Institutional, and Technological Investment,
Making them Particularly Complex, Contentious, and Costly

Emissions trading systems require a large amount of legal,
institutional, and technological investment. In addition to an environmental
regulatory system, they require trading platforms for permits and a parallel
92

See infra Part II.B.
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system of financial regulation.93 The necessity for consistent methodologies
for estimating, reporting, verifying, and monitoring emissions of liable
entities means that the resulting regulatory and advisory bodies require
substantial technical support and resources to monitor and enforce
compliance.94 All of this complexity raises the cost of implementing and
administering an emissions trading system and negates proponents’
economic efficiency claims.
Australia alone established a number of domestic regulatory and
advisory bodies to implement their emissions trading system. Australia’s
Climate Change Authority advises on caps, tracks pollution levels, and
reviews the carbon pricing mechanism; the Clean Energy Regulator
administers the carbon pricing mechanism, the National Greenhouse and
Energy Reporting scheme, the Renewable Energy Target, and the Carbon
Farming Initiative; the Productivity Commission reviews the necessity and
sufficiency of government assistance to industry; the Land Sector Carbon
and Biodiversity Advisory Board oversees land sector initiatives; the Energy
Security Council assesses emerging risks to energy security and offers loans
to energy generators.95 If the Australian emissions trading system survives
current attempts at repeal,96 then implementation and enforcement will be
further complicated by linkage with international systems such as the EU
ETS and the Kyoto Protocol. 97 Additionally, Australia is only in its
93

See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39 (explaining that emissions trading
systems are “inherently more complicated” compared to a “carbon tax”); Lohmann, supra note 72, at 72
(pointing out that “in order to work, greenhouse gas trading has to create a special system of property rights
in the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity”).
94
See Toni E. Moyes, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in New Zealand: Trailblazing
Comprehensive Cap and Trade, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 911, 948 (2008) (explaining that “[r]eliable information
about the emissions produced by participants in an ETS is vital to its integrity and effectiveness. Incorrect
information interferes with the price of emissions units and the attainment of environmental goals of the
scheme. In turn, incorrect information undermines investor confidence in the ETS market and the basis
upon which participants plan to either reduce emissions or purchase emissions units. Emissions must be
monitored accurately and consistently across participants and the collected data must be timely reported to
both the regulator and the market. Further, for confidence, the regulator must be able to verify that reported
emissions data is correct.”).
95
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN ENERGY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 3
(2012), available at http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/cef-overview_apr2012.pdf.
96
Senators rejected the first bill in a package designed by the new government to scrap the clean
energy laws on March 3, 2014. It will be three months before the bill can be re-introduced to the Senate.
AAP, Senators Reject Bill to Scrap Climate Change Authority, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/senators-reject-bill-to-scrap-climate-changeauthority/story-e6frg6xf-1226843760241.
97
Foundations for Global Emissions Trading Set as Australia Linking with Europe, THE CLIMATE
GROUP (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-do/news-and-blogs/foundations-forglobal-emissions-trading-set-as-australia-linking-with-europe/; Press Release, Australia Joins Kyoto
Protocol Second Commitment as World on Track to 2015 Climate Change Agreement, DEP’T OF THE ENV’T,
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transitional, fixed price period, which means that the Clean Energy
Regulator is still designing an auction platform for the coming emissions
trading phase.98
Like Australia, China is in a transitional phase, but one that entails a
substantially more complex shift from multiple, independent pilots at the
regional and municipal levels to a single, uniform national system.99 Prior to
initiating a national emissions trading program, China’s 12th Five Year Plan
(2011-2015) authorized multiple sub-national carbon emissions trading pilot
programs. 100 Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Tianjin
launched pilot emissions trading programs between June and December of
2013; 101 Hubei, Chongqing, and Hangzhou are developing parallel pilot
programs. 102 Because no national legislation reinforces these emissions
trading systems, each local system is authorized by municipal or provincial
administrative rules.103 Each pilot program is implementing or developing a
separate environmental and financial regulatory system and trading
platform,104 which will ultimately be succeeded by a national emissions
trading system. 105 Although the National Development and Reform
Commission is designing a national registry with the United Nations
Development Programme, the pilots are currently developing individual
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, (Dec. 2, 2012), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ministers/hon-gregcombet-am-mp/media-release/australia-joins-kyoto-protocol-second-commitment-world.
98
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, STARTING EMISSIONS TRADING ON 1 JULY 2014: POLICY
SUMMARY 3, 7 (2013), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/sites/climatechange/files/files/
reducing-carbon/carbon-pricing-policy/cef-policy-summary-moving-ets.PDF.
99
See generally, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2011-2015), translated
at http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-five-year-plan-2011-2015-full-english-version.
100
Id.; ANITA TALBERG & KAI SWOBODA, PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES
AROUND THE WORLD 21 (2013), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/EmissionsTradingSchemes.
101
Beijing
Launches
Carbon
Emissions
Trading,
XINHUA
(Nov.
28,
2103),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/sci/2013-11/28/c_132926353.htm (noting that Shenzhen city was the
first to launch its compulsory emissions trading market in June 2013 and that Shanghai launched its pilot
earlier in November 2013); Guangdong Brings Carbon Trading to Life, XINHUA (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/19/c_125887575.htm; Tianjin Starts Carbon Trading
Market, XINHUA (Dec. 26, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/26/c_132999171.htm.
102
Tianjin Starts Carbon Trading Market, supra note 101.
103
JEFF SWARTZ, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, A USER GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING IN CHINA
8 (2013), available at http://www.ieta.org/a-user-guide-to-emissions-trading-in-china--september-2013;
Shanghai shi tan paifang guanli shixing banfa (hufu ling 10 hao) (上海市碳排放管理试行办法（沪府令 10 号）)
[Carbon emissions management pilot scheme in Shanghai (Shanghai Office Ordinance No. 10)]
(promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, Nov. 18, 2013, effective Nov. 20, 2013),
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node12344/u26ai37414.html [hereinafter
“Shanghai Ordinance No. 10”].
104
See generally, SWARTZ, supra note 103.
105
See NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, MARKET READINESS PROPOSAL (MRP): ESTABLISHING A
NATIONAL
EMISSIONS
TRADING
SCHEME
IN
CHINA
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/China_MRP_final_19-02-2013rev_0.pdf.
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registries.106 These pilots will give China some experience in designing and
administering emissions trading systems. Yet China must make substantial
investments in infrastructure and financial regulatory capacity before
implementing a national emissions trading system, and these pilots will only
provide a partial picture of China’s nationwide emissions.
In addition to developing adequate institutional capacity and
expertise, these countries must make a number of technical decisions, many
of which are unique to emissions trading systems. These include setting and
adjusting the national cap, deciding whether the cap is absolute or intensitybased, setting penalties for non-compliance, and determining the scope of
the emissions trading system—who is liable for which emissions and
whether non-emitters, such as financial institutions, may participate. 107
Countries must also decide how parties may meet their emissions reductions
targets, whether and to whom allowances will be freely distributed or
auctioned, whether banking or borrowing of allowances is allowed, and
whether liable parties will be allowed to use carbon credits to offset their
emissions. 108 Uniform standards to measure emissions and effective
methods of monitoring and verifying emissions must be in place to verify
compliance. 109 The various emissions trading platforms must establish
trading rules and require regulatory oversight. 110 There are further
complications if the system is linked to other domestic or international
systems, such as whether the government should put in place any price
controls or subsidies.111
For a system driven by neoliberal, unfettered free-market concepts,
emissions trading requires a substantial amount of government investment
and oversight, including the creation of “a new market structure,
enforcement, audit, fraud prevention, and control mechanisms.” 112 This

106

SWARTZ, supra note 103.
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39; A. DENNY ELLERMAN & IAN SUE WING, MIT
JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, ABSOLUTE VS. INTENSITY-BASED
EMISSION CAPS (2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt100.pdf.
108
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39; DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 54-58.
109
See generally National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00521; National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting
(Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
F2013C00661; National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Audit) Determination 2009 (Cth) (Austl.),
available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012C00678; National Greenhouse and Energy
Reporting (Auditor Registration) Instrument 2012 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/
Details/F2012L02295.
110
For an example of necessary regulations, see Shanghai Ordinance No. 10, supra note 103.
111
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39.
112
Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 613.
107
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undermines proponent’s efficiency claims. 113 As explained below, these
systems are also inefficient because the countries implementing them lack
adequate means to measure, monitor, and verify emissions and offsets.
2.

Inadequate Mechanisms to Measure, Monitor, and Verify Emissions
Will Make it Costly to Ensure Credits and Offsets Represent Actual
Reductions

For an emissions trading system to be effective, countries need
accurate emissions data. Measuring, monitoring, and verifying emissions is
crucial to set environmentally effective emissions cap, allocate allowances,
and assess compliance. Without reliable data, a country might set a cap too
high to be environmentally effective and the prices of permits may plummet,
reducing the incentive for regulated entities to cut emissions. 114 For
example, the price of carbon emissions in the EU ETS collapsed to
essentially zero in 2007 due to a lack of reliable actual emissions data, which
led to an oversupply of permits;115 in January 2013, the price of permits sank
to a new record of 4.76 euros (at the time, USD 6.37) per metric ton.116
One of the advantages of China’s implementation of pilot programs is
that the programs may generate more accurate emissions data, potentially
making any national system adopted thereafter more environmentally
effective.117 Obtaining accurate emissions data is a particular challenge for
China given its wide variation in economic structure, growth rates, energy
consumption, and carbon intensities, especially when coupled with China’s
lack of reliable historic emissions data.118 China has not mandated a unified
methodology to account and report emissions, which may make it difficult
113

Lohmann, supra note 72, at 90 (observing that “[p]oliticians like to say that ‘market approaches’
like emissions trading will prevent the pain of other kinds of regulation”); Press Release, Greg Combet AM
MP, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency: Korea Legislates for Emissions Trading by 2015,
(May 3, 2012), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ministers/hon-greg-combet-am-mp/mediarelease/korea-legislates-emissions-trading-2015 (stating that “[t]here is growing acceptance that . . .
emissions trading schemes and carbon prices are the cheapest and most efficient way of reducing
emissions”).
114
Richard G. Newell et al., Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New
Challenges, 27 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 123, 128 (2013).
115
Id.
116
Ewa Krukowska, EU Carbon Permits ‘Worthless’ Without Change of Rules, UBS Says,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-21/eu-carbon-permits-worthlesswithout-change-of-rules-ubs-says.html.
117
GUOYI HAN, ET AL., FORES STUDY, CHINA’S CARBON EMISSION TRADING AN OVERVIEW OF
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT xxi, 42 (2012), available at http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/
documents/Publications/china-cluster/SEI-FORES-2012-China-Carbon-Emissions.pdf.
118
Id.
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for pilots to transition to a national system.119 There are also concerns that
pilots have not put in place stringent data-quality requirements, and that the
economic data on which the emissions-intensity caps are based could be
manipulated, undermining the pilots’ stringency.120
Unfortunately, the demand for emissions trading systems has
surpassed measurement and monitoring capabilities. This phenomenon is
partially explained by the fact that carbon emissions trading systems were
translated from the United States sulfur dioxide emissions context to global
carbon dioxide emissions.121 These are very distinct contexts—for example,
merely stabilizing sulfur dioxide emissions prevents acid rain,122 whereas
only absolute reductions of carbon dioxide emissions can counteract climate
change.123 Moreover, there is no known means of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions apart from refraining from combusting fossil fuels.124 Absent a
quick technological fix,125 transitioning to a low carbon society requires
radical innovation and structural economic changes.126
The greatest difference between applying an emissions trading system
in the carbon dioxide context rather than the sulfur dioxide context is
coverage. The sulfur dioxide market in the United States consisted of
roughly 500 large, similar, stationary, and easily monitored sources; in
contrast, the global carbon dioxide market is hundreds of millions of diverse,
individual sources that may be impossible to monitor directly.127 This makes
the task of administering a carbon market over an environmentally
significant percentage of a country’s emissions formidable, particularly for
countries that lack the technical and institutional capability to quantify and
monitor industrial greenhouse gas emissions precisely and regularly. 128
Consequently, emerging carbon emissions trading systems rely heavily on
119

Ranping Song, Inside China’s Emissions Trading Scheme: First Steps and the Road Ahead,
WORLD RES. INST. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/inside-china’s-emissions-trading-schemefirst-steps-and-road-ahead (explaining that China has not mandated a unified monitoring, reporting, or
verification method during the pilot phase).
120
Id.
121
Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 19-21; Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 15.
122
Some critics question whether emissions trading was solely responsible for the clean-up of sulfur
dioxide emissions in the United States. See Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 20; Jonathan Remy Nash,
Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle, 24
HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 465, 492 (2000).
123
Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 15.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 71; Anderson & Bows, supra note 82; Lohmann, supra note 72, at
330-31.
127
Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 15-16.
128
See, e.g., Lohmann, supra note 72, at 98.
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industry reporting rather than solely on impartial authorities129 and tend to
limit coverage to large, immobile emitters such as power generators.130
Both the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme and South Korea’s
pending emissions trading system have comparatively broad coverage, in
that they regulate emissions from agriculture and forestry. 131 Because
carbon dioxide is not the dominant greenhouse gas emission in New
Zealand, regulation of deforestation and agricultural emissions such as
methane and nitrous oxide is essential for New Zealand’s emissions trading
system to be environmentally effective.132 This breadth of coverage makes
monitoring, reporting, and verification of compliance more challenging.
New Zealand adapted the 2002 Climate Change Response Act’s
electronic registry, which was established to track Kyoto units and emissions
allocations, to serve as the national reporting and recording structure.133
Like other emerging emissions trading systems, this structure is highly
dependent on self-assessment and self-reporting,134 which creates a risk that
regulated entities will misrepresent data.135 For example, emissions permits
129

See, e.g., Moyes, supra note 94, at 948 (citing T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1, 166 (2006)) (observing that virtually all systems rely on self-reporting
coupled with external oversight out of necessity).
130
See infra Part III.B.1. South Korea is somewhat unique in that it has a company-level threshold
for receiving a mandatory cap as opposed to a facility or building-level threshold, resulting in somewhat
broader coverage than other emissions trading systems. SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 9, at 5.
131
Moyes, supra note 94, at 913-14; NORTON ROSE, ASIA PACIFIC CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY SERIES:
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 2 (May 2011), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/asia-pacific-climate-changepolicy-series-republic-of-korea-52311.pdf. South Korea’s trial emissions trading scheme, the Target
Management Scheme, includes forestry and agriculture as well. Id.
132
Agriculture accounted for 47.19% of New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2011; energy
only accounted for 42.58%. UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, SUMMARY OF GHG
EMISSIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 2, available at https://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/
nzl_ghg_profile.pdf. By comparison, energy as a percentage of total emission accounted for 76.42% in
Australia, 77.25% in China, 91.32% in Japan, and 83.47% in South Korea that same year. See UNITED
NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, GHG EMISSION PROFILES FOR ANNEX 1 PARTIES AND MAJOR
GROUPS, available at http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php; UNITED
NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, GHG EMISSION PROFILES FOR NON-ANNEX 1 PARTIES, available
at http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4626.php.
133
MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME:
4 CORE DESIGN FEATURES CONTINUED, available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/
framework-emissions-trading-scheme-sep07/html/page6a.html.
134
Moyes, supra note 94, at 948-49.
135
Also, private carbon consultancies, private auditors, and rating agencies that help design, validate,
verify, and certify greenhouse gas emissions reductions and projects may “have little incentive to question
the effectiveness of the carbon projects they work on, since to do so would be to jeopardise [sic] their
chances of getting future work.” Lohmann, supra note 72, at 61 (describing controversies surrounding
validators of United Nations CDM projects and the problem of conflicts of interest in international climate
politics); see also MICHAEL GILLENWATER & STEPHEN SERES, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: A REVIEW OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL OFFSET PROGRAM 24-25
(2011), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/clean-development-mechanism-review-of-firstinternational-offset-program.pdf (describing structural problems within the CDM project auditing process,
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for the EU ETS were also initially based on estimates prepared by
corporations themselves, resulting in permit allocation that exceeded carbon
emissions by 50% in some industries.136 While this risk is likely not unique
to emissions trading systems, it is amplified in the emissions trading context
because the resulting credits or offsets can be sold for a profit to other
emitters who then use those credits to offset their emissions.
Further, emissions from livestock, synthetic fertilizer, and
deforestation pose unique obstacles to gathering emissions data. Unlike
emissions from a single point source, such as a power generation facility,
agricultural emissions from a single farm are strongly affected by weather
variations and natural landscapes. 137 There is significant uncertainty in
calculating agricultural emissions because they are often the product of
unpredictable microbial processes.138 This uncertainty makes it difficult for
countries to set a meaningful national cap, allocate an appropriate number of
allowances, and monitor compliance.139 Without an accurate measurement
of these emissions, New Zealand resorted to using proxy estimates, such as
emissions per number of livestock animals, amount of farm productivity, or
quantity of fertilizer purchased—proxies that are not particularly accurate.140
Another challenge is measuring carbon removal by the biosphere. In
2008, New Zealand’s emissions trading system phased in the forestry sector
and recognized “carbon sequestration” and “sinks.” 141 Landowners are
granted emissions reduction credits for forestry activities that lead to the
removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and, conversely, are held
liable for deforestation and practices that release carbon dioxide. 142
Australia,143 China,144 and Japan,145 similar to New Zealand, allow carbon
such as the fact that auditors are paid by project developers, creating “the potential for conflicts of interest,”
and the fact that the demand for project auditing exceeds the capacity of auditing firms, which “can lead to
less than high quality auditing” as “audit firms attempt to finish projects quickly in order to handle the
growing backlog”).
136
DEL WESTON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL WARMING: THE TERMINAL CRISIS 43 (2014).
137
Stephen Russell, Managing GHG Emissions from Agriculture: A Unique but Solvable Challenge,
WORLD RES. INST. (May 14, 2012), http://www.wri.org/blog/managing-ghg-emissions-agriculture-uniquesolvable-challenge.
138
Id.
139
See Newell et al., supra note 114; Moyes, supra note 94.
140
Moyes, supra note 94, at 957.
141
MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 133.
142
Id.
143
Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00101. For a description of eligible projects, see Carbon
Farming Initiative: Activities-eligible and excluded, DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T,
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/reducing-carbon/carbon-farming-initiative/activities-eligible-andexcluded (last visited May 8, 2014).
144
Ling Ma, Guangdong Calls for More Forest Carbon Sink Projects, ICIS (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2013/12/20/9737769/guangdong-calls-for-more-forest-carbon-sink-
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sinks to generate emissions credits, and South Korea is moving in that
direction. 146 However, measuring the capacity of a particular forest to
sequester carbon dioxide entails a high margin of error.147 It is difficult for
regulators to determine when to require liable entities to report changes in
stored carbon and in what quantities because carbon accumulates in the
forest and soil slowly. 148 Finally, testing for stored carbon dioxide is
expensive.149
Beyond these significant verification issues, carbon sinks are based on
the flawed assumption that stored, biotic carbon 150 is equivalent to
reductions in fossil carbon emissions.151 Although carbon dioxide emissions
stay in the atmosphere for centuries, 152 carbon exchanged from the
atmosphere to the biosphere is easily reversible—for instance, a tree
plantation designed to store carbon might burn in wildfire, or be turned into
paper or furniture that decomposes in a landfill.153 In other words, “one

projects/; NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, CHINA’S POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE
CHANGE 10, 23-24, 40 (2013), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201311/P0201311086115330
42884.pdf.
145
See generally MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, REVIEW OF THE OFFSET CREDIT (J-VER) SCHEME (20082013) (2013), available at http://www.j-ver.go.jp/document/e/j-ver_generalization_eng.pdf; MINISTRY OF
ECON.,
TRADE
&
INDUS.,
J-CREDIT
SCHEME
10
(2013),
available
at
http://www.japancredit.go.jp/pdf/english/credit_english_001_2.pdf.
146
The Act on Maintenance and Promotion of Carbon Sinks was approved in March 2013—this
called for a forest carbon offset registry to enable forest preservation to generate offset credits under their
emissions trading system.
Introduction: Forest Carbon Center, FOREST CARBON CTR.,
http://carbon.kgpa.or.kr/flow/?ref=menu/view.emt&menu_table=m1_00&menu_idx=010000 (last visited
May 8, 2014); see also Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits
(promulgated by the Nat’l Assemb. on May 14, 2012, effective Nov. 15, 2012) arts. 29, 30 (S. Kor.).
147
Moyes, supra note 94, at 960. Estimates of carbon sequestration rates in China’s forests differ by
up to 89%, depending on the measuring methodology. Lohmann, supra note 72, at 155.
148
Russell, supra note 137.
149
Di Martin, Confidence in Soil Carbon Eroding, ABC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013)
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/the-carbon-conundrum/4532742.
150
Carbon stored in several major sinks: “(a) as organic molecules in living and dead organisms
found in the biosphere; (b) as the gas carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; (c) as organic matter in soils; (d) in
the lithosphere as fossil fuels and sedimentary rock deposits such as limestone, dolomite and chalk; and (e)
in the oceans as dissolved atmospheric carbon dioxide and as calcium carbonate shells in marine
organisms.” Michael Pidwirny, Carbon Cycle, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (May 7, 2012),
http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/150923/.
151
Lohmann, supra note 72, at 154.
152
Mason Inman, Carbon is Forever, NATURE (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/
0812/full/climate.2008.122.html (noting that it is difficult to estimate the lifetime of atmospheric carbon
dioxide because it gets absorbed by a variety of processes, some of which take a few years, others a few
hundreds of years, and still others a few thousands of years. In human terms, this means that carbon
dioxide emissions and their warming effects essentially last forever. Additionally, a percentage of carbon
dioxide stays in the atmosphere permanently or is re-released.).
153
Lohmann, supra note 72, at 155.
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[ton] of carbon in a tree is climatically not the same as one [ton] of carbon in
a deep coal deposit.”154
Despite claims to the contrary, emissions trading systems are
inefficient. Obtaining accurate data on emissions and sinks is key. Yet
verifying carbon sinks entails frequent and expensive testing, the
unreliability of which could result in costly errors, such as over-allocation of
permits. Due to the penchant of carbon dioxide to be re-released from the
biosphere to the atmosphere, substantial measures are needed to ensure sinks
are permanent. Inadequate mechanisms for measuring, monitoring, and
verifying emissions also create opportunities for error and abuse, making
enforcement difficult and necessitating substantial governmental
oversight.155 These inefficiencies would be less concerning if emissions
trading systems successfully reduced carbon dioxide emissions. As the next
section explains, they do not.
B.

Emissions Trading on the Pacific Rim Will Likely Not Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions

The emissions trading systems adopted by these Pacific Rim countries
will likely fail to reduce emissions and reverse climate change. Such
systems are ineffective because 1) they are poorly suited to regulating the
many, diverse sources of carbon dioxide emissions, and 2) the decisions to
freely allocate allowances and permit the use of offsets will likely result in
over-allocation and an increase, not a decrease, in emissions. Rather, these
emissions trading systems will legitimize the continued use of fossil fuels
and create new sources of profit for the fossil fuel industry.

154

Id.
See, e.g., Stefano Valentino, Carbon Trading: Why ‘Good’ Companies Embrace ‘Bad’ Credits,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2012/0423/Carbontrading-Why-good-companies-embrace-bad-credits (describing how the Kyoto Protocol carbon credit
system incentivized a number of manufacturers to intentionally produce far more HFC-23 emissions than
necessary in order to later reduce those emissions and sell the resulting credits for profit. Consequently,
these emitters profited by accelerating global warming. Although EU ETS ultimately banned these CERs,
industries lobbied for an extension, and the ban was delayed until May 1, 2013.); GILLENWATER & SERES,
supra note 135, at 18-19 (explaining how the initial CDM program had neither the procedures nor
resources to thoroughly review all projects and issued little guidance on the concept of “additionality.” The
CDM has since put in place detailed methods and requirements, added new layers of audit and review, and
increased staff.).
155
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Emissions Trading Systems on the Pacific Rim Provide Incomplete
Coverage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Emissions trading cannot adequately regulate the numerous sources of
greenhouse gasses. Nearly half of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, or
roughly 45.6%, originate from the energy sector and industry. 156 The
remaining 54.4% comes from various sectors, including transportation,
livestock, agriculture, forestry, residential and commercial buildings, and
waste.157 Some of these sectors pose significant challenges to designing and
administering a comprehensive emissions trading system. For example, in
the personal transportation sector, emissions trading systems have higher
transaction costs are less effective than vehicle emissions standards, in part
because it is hard to verify the actual emissions of automobiles during their
use.158 In the agricultural sector, emissions from a single farm can fluctuate
widely over time and are difficult to measure.159
Consequently, most emissions systems are limited to large, immobile
emitters in the stationary energy and non-energy industrial sectors, which
leaves unregulated significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions. For
example, China’s pilot projects cover large immobile sources from various
industries.160 Within these regulated industries, only facilities that reach an
emissions threshold are required to surrender emissions allowances.161 Such
thresholds may reduce administrative costs, but undermine the system’s
environmental effectiveness because not all sources of carbon dioxide are

156

UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 11 (2012), available at
http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf (using emissions data from 2010).
157
Id.
158
Why Emissions Trading is More Effective than Command and Control, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING
ASS’N, http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=418:why-emissions-tradingis-more-effective-than-command-and-control&catid=54:3-minute-briefing&Itemid=135 (last visited Apr.
29, 2014).
159
See infra Part III.A.2.
160
SWARTZ, supra note 103, at 4 (including iron and steel, chemicals, cement, electricity, heat,
petrochemical, power, oil and gas mining, construction, and public buildings).
161
This emissions threshold ranges from companies that emit more than 60,000 tons of coal
consumption for major sectors in the year 2010 or 2011 in Hubei province, to 20,000 tons per year for
major sectors in 2010 or 2011 in Shanghai and 5,000 tons per year in Shenzhen. Id.
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capped.162 Similar limitations can be found in the other four experiments in
Australia,163 Japan,164 New Zealand,165 and South Korea.166
As explained in Part III.A.2, New Zealand and South Korea are
exceptions to the narrow sectoral coverage as they intend to regulate a wide
array of sectors, including agriculture, waste, forestry, fishing, and
transportation.167 The challenges of accurately measuring, monitoring, and
verifying emissions and sinks in the agriculture and forestry sectors makes it
difficult to develop environmentally effective caps, allocate permits, and
enforce compliance.168 In 2012, the New Zealand legislature postponed the
surrender obligations for biological emissions from agriculture indefinitely,
citing the lack of economically viable and practical technologies for farmers
162

Beijing’s system is expected to cover only 40-50% of total emissions in Beijing; Tianjin’s is
expected to cover slightly more, or 60% of Tianjin’s emissions, and Chongqing’s is expected to cover
slightly less, or 35-45% of Chongqing’s emissions. Id.; Beijing Launches Carbon Emissions Trading,
XINHUA (Nov. 28, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2013-11/28/c_132926353.htm. Shenzhen
covers just 38% of the city’s emissions. China “Launches its First Carbon Trading Scheme,” PHYS.ORG
(June 18, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-06-china-carbon-scheme.html#inlRlv.
163
Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism requires any facility that emits above an annual threshold
of 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide to surrender emission permits to the government. Explanatory
Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 33 (Austl.). In 2012, this system covered 377 entities, or 60%
of Australia’s emissions. Id. at 45; TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 11. This excludes the
agricultural and transport sectors, businesses, households, and light commercial vehicles; the transport
sector is partially covered through a carbon price and fuel excise tax on fuel—excluding fuels used for light
commercial transport, households, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Id. at 34; PETER SOPHER &
ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, AUSTRALIA, THE WORLD’S
MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 3 (2013), available at
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_australia_case_study_
september_2013.pdf.
164
Tokyo’s municipal-level emissions trading system only covers companies that use fuels, heat, and
electricity in excess of 1500 kiloliters of crude oil equivalent per year, and it covers only about twenty 20%
of Tokyo’s emissions, or 1% of Japan’s national emissions. TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19;
PETER SOPHER & ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, JAPAN, THE
WORLD’S MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 2 (2013), available at
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_ japan_case_study_
september_2013.pdf.
165
Participation in the New Zealand system is mandatory for individual installations that exceed
sector-specific emissions thresholds, and for liquid fossil fuel refiners who refine more than 50,000 liters.
PETER SOPHER & ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, NEW
ZEALAND, THE WORLD’S MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 2 (2013), available at
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_new_zealand_case_study_
september_2013.pdf.
166
In South Korea, compliance is mandatory for companies or workplaces that meet the emissions
threshold (an annual discharge of over 125,000 tCO2e for companies or over 25,000 tCO2e for workplaces).
SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 9, at 2-3. South Korea’s trial emissions trading system covers about 60%
of the country’s annual greenhouse gas emissions. South Korean Emissions 31% Higher Than Government
Forecast,
THOMSON
REUTERS
(Feb.
12,
2014),
https://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/
pressroom/pressreleases/1.4086316.
167
See MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 133.
168
See infra Part III.A.2.
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to reduce emissions and trading partners’ lack of progress.169 Roughly half
of New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions are now unregulated by the
scheme,170 severely curtailing its environmental effectiveness.
These emissions thresholds and limitations to particular emissions
sectors are structural features that make emissions trading systems
ineffective climate change policies. However, these particular experiments
have additional coverage limitations. For example, partial geographic
coverage is a separate issue in China, where most pilot programs are in the
coastal cities and provinces of Eastern China.171 It is estimated that 80% of
emissions related to items consumed in these coastal provinces and
municipalities are released in less-developed provinces in central China.172
Until a national system exists, the pilots may exacerbate emissions
outsourcing within the country, without producing significant reductions in
China’s overall emissions. 173
Japan has huge gaps in coverage to the extent that their mandatory
emissions trading systems are subnational only.174 Like the Kyoto Protocol,
Japan’s national emissions trading program is entirely voluntary. 175
Consequently, from 2005 to 2009, the Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading
Scheme (“JVETS”) covered less than one percent of Japan’s industrial
emissions, and less than one-third of participants adopted absolute targets.176
169

Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2012 (N.Z.),
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2012/0052/latest/versions.aspx, summarized at
Legislative Changes to the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), CLIMATE CHANGE INFO.,
NEW ZEALAND (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/etsamendments/; see also Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 Nov. 2012, 6449 (Hon.
Tim Groser, Minister for Climate Change Issues) (Austl.), available at http://www.parliament.nz/ennz/pb/debates/debates/50HansD_20121108_00000016/climate-change-response-emissions-trading-andother-matters.
170
See UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT supra note 132.
171
See generally SWARTZ, supra note 103.
172
China is Outsourcing Carbon Within its Own Borders, PHYS.ORG (June 10, 2013),
http://phys.org/news/2013-06-china-outsourcing-carbon-borders.html#inlRlv.
173
Id.; see also TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 21-22 (noting the possibility that by
establishing pilots in only a handful of provinces, industry will be tempted to relocate to unaffected
provinces).
174
Japan’s proposals for a nation-wide carbon emission trading scheme or tax have succumbed to
substantial political resistance. Leo Shanahan, Japan’s Energy Crisis Puts ETS Launch on Ice, THE
AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/japans-energycrisis-puts-ets-launch-on-ice/story-e6frg6xf-1226284525560. Consequently, the emissions trading schemes
implemented to meet Japan’s international targets are sub-national in scope or else voluntary in nature. See
Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor’s Orders? Mostly no! A
Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan Before and After the
Earthquake 5-6, (CESifo Working Paper: Resource and Environment Economics, No. 3639, 2011),
available at https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/52425/1/672560097.pdf, at 5-6; TALBERG &
SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19.
175
See generally SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 164.
176
Id. at 3-4.
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The Integrated Domestic Emissions Trading Market that succeeded this
national scheme in 2008 is still voluntary, at its height covering 70% of
Japan’s industrial firms. 177 Reported emissions reductions are not
necessarily reliable because only a few participants accepted external
monitoring or verification.178 Participants could borrow allowances or invest
in project-based Kyoto Protocol mechanisms to generate credits, which
saved them from non-compliance with their own targets.179 Additionally,
participants that failed to meet their targets faced nominal penalties. 180
Japan’s only mandatory emissions trading schemes are at the municipal and
regional levels.181
The emissions trading systems along the Pacific Rim regulate
greenhouse gas emissions incompletely. Some are geographically limited,
others cover only a few emissions sectors, and all are limited to large,
generally fixed sources of emissions. This partial coverage limits their
ability to meaningfully reduce emissions because not all emitters are
required to make cuts.
2.

The Decision to Freely Allocate Allowances and Permit the Use of
Offsets Will Likely Result in Over-allocation and an Increase of
Emissions

Emissions trading systems have not reduced emissions as promised.182
Their effectiveness depends on lowering the total allowable emissions over
time, forcing emitters to either purchase increasingly scarce and thus
expensive emission rights, reduce emissions through investment in lower
emission technology or carbon capture and storage, or pay a penalty for
noncompliance. 183 As a result, emissions trading systems face severe
177

Rudolph & Schneider, supra note 174, at 6-8.
Id.
179
Id. at 7-8.
180
Randall S. Jones & Byungseo Yoo, Improving the Policy Framework in Japan to Address Climate
Change 140 (OECD Economic Surveys, Working Paper No. 740, 2009).
181
Tokyo launched a mandatory, municipal emissions trading scheme in April 2010; Saitama,
Japan’s fifth most populous prefecture, launched a nearly identical emissions trading system in 2011.
TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19-20.
182
See Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 615 (observing that “the theory of carbon markets is based on
the idea that a deregulated market will be the most efficient approach to carbon minimization because it is
claimed that by eliminating ‘regulatory interventions such as carbon taxes or precise standards for
polluters . . . the market will seek out the most efficient means of achieving the same emissions reduction
goals.’ . . . Though the evidence so far indicates that the ambitions of neoliberal, market oriented carbon
policy have remained unfulfilled. . . Therefore, relying on an ETS to reduce carbon pollution is either naïve,
or this was never the primary purpose.”).
183
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 20 (observing that emissions reductions imposed on industry must
be real, significant, and continue to decrease over time).
178
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opposition, particularly from carbon intensive industries and industries
exposed to international competition with countries that lack or have less
stringent climate laws.184 Unfortunately, this opposition frequently results in
concessions to emitters, including the adoption of low national or sectoral
emission reduction targets, free allocation of emission allowances, the use of
offsets, and expanded state aid.185 These concessions are environmentally
harmful because they allow regulated entities to ostensibly comply with
emissions caps while maintaining or increasing their emissions. As
explained below, such concessions are characteristic of the emissions trading
systems adopted in Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
The free allocation of allowances, undermines emissions trading
systems by reducing the incentive for regulated entities to reduce emissions
and creating windfall profits for emitters. Emissions allowances are
valuable property rights that, counterintuitively, are awarded to the most
carbon intensive industries. 186 They derive their value from allowing
holders to avoid cutting emissions. 187 When emission allowances are
auctioned, the price of reducing emissions is born by the regulated industry
and the government earns revenue that may be put to other uses. 188
Conversely, when emission allowances are allocated free of cost, the
regulated entities gain a valuable property interest that may be sold for a
profit and the cost of achieving emissions reductions is shifted from the
regulated industry to the taxpayer.189 Thus free allocation undercuts the
ability of an emissions trading system to incentivize emissions cuts and asks
taxpayers to subsidize emissions-intensive industries.190
Over-allocation undermines emissions trading systems. Theoretically,
a gradually declining emissions cap, regardless of the price of allowances,
compels regulated entities to reduce emissions.191 Yet, emissions trading
184

Harro van Asselt & Thomas Brewer, Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns in
Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU, 38 ENERGY POL. 42
(2009).
185
See, e.g., NORTON ROSE, supra note 131, at 1; Sangim Han, South Korean Parliament Approves
Carbon Trading System, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-05-02/south-korean-parliament-approves-carbon-trading-system.html.
186
See Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 18; Lohmann, supra note 72 at 344.
187
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 31.
188
Id. at 31-32.
189
Under the EU ETS, the German power company, RWE, is estimated to have earned €1.8 billion in
a year by charging customers for permits it received for free. Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 75 (arguing
that free allocation of permits creates “incentive to pass on the cost to consumers to reap windfall profits.
Even if an industry receives emissions permits free of charge, the price of its products typically rise to
reflect the value of the permits. . . because free permits have an opportunity cost: excess permits can be
sold in the market.”).
190
See id.
191
See DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 20.
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systems are vulnerable to over-allocation,192 meaning that the emissions cap
is set higher than actual emissions, 193 possibly in response to political
pressure for more free allowances or as a result of inaccurate and incomplete
emissions data or projections. When allowances are over-allocated, there is
no scarcity of allowances and regulated entities have enough permits to
cover their current emissions, if not further emissions, meaning there is no
incentive for regulated entities to cut emissions.194 Essentially, the emissions
trading system begins to subsidize emissions intensive industries, 195
encouraging investment in, and perpetuating reliance upon, fossil fuels.
The use of offsets allows regulated entities to reduce emissions from
activities outside the scope of the emissions trading system to generate
emissions reduction credits—credits that may be used to meet their own
emissions reduction requirements. 196 Offsets theoretically help achieve
compliance at the lowest possible cost197—if carbon dioxide emissions are
equivalent across industries and regions, offsets allow emissions reductions
192

Largely due to free allocation of permits. See Alex Scott, EU Carbon Emission Trading Scheme
In Freefall, C&EN (Feb. 18, 2013), http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/i7/EU-Carbon-Emissions-TradingScheme.html (explaining that in the EU ETS, the high number of exemptions for energy-intensive
industries, plus the economic recession that suppressed manufacturing, created a huge oversupply of carbon
emissions allowances. In 2013, just over 50% of allowances were auctioned—the remainder were freely
allocated. Without intervention, the scheme will result in zero emissions reductions by 2020).
193
In other words, “there is a fundamental lack of scarcity of allowances.” Lesley K. McAllister, The
Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUMBIA J. OF ENVT’L L. 395,
411 (2009).
194
Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 615 (attributing the failure of the First Phase of the EU ETS to an
oversupply of permits by the regulatory authorities); Will Nichols, EU Carbon Markets Set “To Be
Oversupplied until 2027,” BUSINESSGREEN (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/
2295736/eu-carbon-markets-set-to-be-oversupplied-until-2027 (analysts predict that the 2.5 billion excess
carbon credits at the start of Phase III of the EU ETS will not be fully eroded until the mid-2020s with more
aggressive climate policies); Damian Carrington, EU Emissions Trading Scheme “Set to Cancel Out
Renewable Energy Gains,” THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2013/jun/25/eu-emissions-trading-scheme-energy
(finding huge oversupplies of carbon pollution permits in the EU ETS, many of which “are being banked to
enable emissions after 2020, when efforts to tackle global warming should be intensifying.” The price of
carbon permits was as low as €4.13 in July 2013, far below the €30 analysts say is needed to effectively
reduce emissions.); Backloading Inadequate to Revitalize EU ETS, FORTUM (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.fortum.com/en/mediaroom/pages/fortum-backloading-inadequate-to-revitalise-eu-emissionstrading.aspx (arguing that reducing the oversupply that has led to the plummeting of price of emissions
allowances in the EU ETS will require “backloading,” or temporarily withdrawing 900 million allowances
from the market in 2013-2015 and postponing the auctioning of them until 2019-2020).
195
Keating, supra note 78 (according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, “the steel, cement, refining,
lime, glass, ceramics, and pulp sectors all generated a profit” within the European Union’s emissions
trading scheme by being over-allocated. For example, the steel sector was given 1.2 million allowances for
free over five years, and only 729,000 were used—which “translates to a theoretical profit of €1.5 million
for the sector.”).
196
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 19.
197
INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, supra note 157 (asserting that “cap-and-trade will deliver its
environmental objective at the lowest cost to the economy”).
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to be made wherever they are the cheapest, or most efficient. Offsets,
however, compromise the environmental objectives. If offsets are unlimited,
or if limits are unenforced, then they enable regulated entities to pollute over
the cap,198 meaning that the cap could steadily decline, but emissions could
actually increase. Thus, offsets exacerbate the effects of over-allocation. 199
Even if the use of offsets is limited to a percentage of a regulated entity’s
allowances, it is difficult to verify that offsets represent actual emission
reductions.200 Assuming the integrity of offsets could be consistently and
accurately verified, the cost of doing so cuts into the alleged efficiency of
emissions trading systems. 201 Finally, offsets directly and indirectly 202
perpetuate reliance on fossil fuels, particularly in the most fossil-fuel
intensive industries and countries203 where emissions reductions are arguably
more urgent because of the greater cost.
The emissions trading systems in Australia, China, Japan, New
Zealand, and South Korea are flawed to the extent that they all freely
allocate permits and sanction the use of offsets. Both characteristics render
the programs more vulnerable to over-allocation and effectively subsidize
198

CARBON TRADE WATCH, CARBON OFFSETS FACT SHEET 2 1 (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/publications/factsheet02-offsets.pdf.
199
Keating, supra note 78 (observing that if international credits such as credits through the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM are considered, the EU ETS’s total credit surplus is almost two billion allowances, worth
€7.3 billion in May 2013).
200
See infra Part III.A.2; CARBON TRADE WATCH, supra note 197; Newell et al., supra note 114, at
137; James Wright, Politicians Right to Rebuff Business Lobby’s Scheming, PRECARIOUS CLIMATE (Mar. 8,
2013), http://precariousclimate.com/2013/03/08/politicians-right-aig-business-lobby-scheming/ (criticizing
international offsets as “a breeding ground for creating accounting while preventing structural
decarbonization of the Australian economy”).
201
Newell et al., supra note 114, at 137 (to reduce emissions, “credits can only be given to projects
(and for measurable reductions) that would not have occurred without the offset credit program. At the
same time, rigorous screening creates transaction costs that eat into potential cost savings.”).
202
Indirectly because offsets compensate for continuing present carbon emissions; directly because
the offset projects compensating for those emissions may actually be “supercritical” coal-fired power plants
eligible for CDM credits. Stephen Lacey, In The ‘Crazy’ World Of Carbon Finance, Coal Now Qualifies
For Emission Reduction Credits, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/
2012/09/19/865471/in-the-crazy-world-of-carbon-finance-coal-now-qualifies-for-emission-reductioncredits/# (observing that because new coal-fired power stations are eligible for CDM credits, “a coal-fired
power plant in Europe could be “offset” by carbon credits . . . through another carbon-burning coal plant in
India.”); Michael Lazarus & Chelsea Chandler, Coal Power in the CDM: Issues and Options (Stockholm
Environment Institute, Working Paper 2011), available at http://sei-us.org/Publications_PDF/SEI-WP2011-02-Coal-in-CDM-ES.pdf (questioning whether the CDM should be used to support marginal
improvements in coal emission rates when the vast majority of such projects would have proceeded with or
without the CDM and lock in over 400 million tons per year in emissions).
203
See CARBON TRADE WATCH, supra note 197 (arguing that offset projects enable continued
pollution in industrialized countries and shift responsibility for emission reductions); Lohmann, supra note
72, at 103-04 (arguing that “[i]nstead of encouraging the type of innovations, long-term investments and
broad restructuring that are crucial to speeding the transition to a society that doesn’t use fossil fuels,
[offsets discourage] them in favor of scattered stopgap measures that may ultimately be very costly.”).
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fossil fuel use or at least reduce the incentive to cut emissions. This prevents
the systems from attaining meaningful emissions reductions.
a.

These emissions trading systems are flawed to the extent that they
freely allocate allowances

When the Australian emission trading system began in 2012, Australia
allocated free permits for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities for up
to 94.5% of the industry baseline emissions intensity, or 66% for the lessintensive and less-exposed industries.204 These baselines are drawn from
historic emissions and production data submitted by the regulated entities
themselves.205 Awarding free credits on the basis of data submitted by the
regulated parties themselves increases the risk of over-allocation and little
abatement. 206 Also, these free permits essentially subsidize the largest
emitters. Apart from free allocation, Australia also awarded coal fired
electricity generators assistance in free units and cash payments.207 Because
the quantity of permits available for purchase is unlimited in Australia until
June 2015 when an emissions cap is introduced, there is not an absolute limit
on the quantity of emissions.208
204

TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 12; Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed: Eligibility,
CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR, http://ret.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/For-Industry/Emissions-IntensiveTrade-Exposed/eligibility (last visited May 8, 2014) (defining emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities
and degrees of assistance); CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, GUIDE TO CARBON PRICE
LIABILITY
UNDER
THE
CLEAN
ENERGY
ACT
2011
16-17
(2012),
available
at
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Fact-sheets-FAQs-and-guidelines/
Guidelines/Documents/Guide%20to%20Carbon%20Price%20Liability.pdf (describing financial assistance
available to energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program,
and assistance to coal-fired generators under the Energy Security Fund, including cash payments and free
allocations); Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 162 (Austl.) (noting an initial
assistance of “94.5 per cent of the allocative baseline for activities that have an emissions intensity of at
least 2,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of revenue or 6,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value
added in the specified assessment period; or 66 per cent of the allocative baseline for activities that have an
emissions intensity between 1,000 tonnes CO2 e/million dollars of revenue and 1,999 tonnes of CO2
e/million dollars of revenue, or between 3,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value added and 5,999
tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value added in the specified assessment period.”). These rates of
assistance are reduced by 1.3 % each year. Id.
205
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 204, at 163.
206
Lohmann, supra note 72, at 98 (observing that in the past, when data on industrial emissions has
been provided by polluting companies themselves rather than an impartial authority or measurement of
actual emissions, there were large margins of error and chronic underreporting); see also Splash & Lo,
supra note 75, at 73 (arguing that “this is exactly the situation arising under Phase I of the EU ETS where
permits prices fell dramatically”).
207
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 204, at 182-83 (noting 41.705 million free carbon units
annually over the years 2013-14 to 2016-17 and one billion in cash payments in the first compliance year).
208
Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 73. Should the carbon pricing mechanism be repealed and
replaced by the Direct Action policy, emissions reductions will be purchased through competitive
government grants, and there will be no overall emissions cap or disincentive to continue emitting at the
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China’s pilot programs allocate emissions permits primarily for free.
Of the five programs already launched, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and
Tianjin allocate emissions permits for free.209 Thus far, Guangdong is the
only pilot program that requires companies to buy a portion of their
allowances through auction—three percent in 2013, and increasing to ten
percent by 2015.210 Like Australia, the pilot programs’ emissions caps are
not absolute, but rather intensity-based.211 Emissions intensity is the ratio of
carbon dioxide emissions to some measure of economic output.212 Under
intensity-based caps, absolute emissions may increase even as emissions
intensity improves.213
Japan lacks a mandatory, nationwide emissions trading scheme.214
Japanese companies have participated voluntarily in JVETS, which
distributed allowances freely from 2005 to 2009, and government subsidies
were available to finance one third of a company’s abatement measures.215
The Integrated Domestic Emissions Trading Market that succeeded this
scheme in 2008 removed subsidies for abatement measures, but it remains
voluntary and subsidizes polluters to the extent that they may choose
between several free allowances to meet the target of their choice. 216
same rate—rather, tax-payers will purchase abatement. See generally LIBERAL PARTY OF AUSTRALIA, WE
HAVE A PLAN FOR REAL ACTION: 10. REDUCE CARBON EMISSIONS, http://www.liberal.org.au/our-plan/
environment; Anthony Hobley, Repeal of the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, or a clever case of
re-branding?,
BUSINESSGREEN
(Sept.
10,
2013),
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/opinion/
2293636/repeal-of-the-australian-carbon-pricing-mechanism-or-a-clever-case-of-rebranding; Lisa Caripis,
The Coalition’s Climate Change Policy: It’s the Public, not Polluters, who Pay, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19,
2013) http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/coalition-climate-change-direct-action.
209
SWARTZ, supra note 103, at 4, 25, 38, and 43; Shànghǎi shì rénmín zhèngfǔ guānyú běn shì
kāizhǎn tàn páifàng jiāoyì shìdiǎn gōngzuò de shíshī yìjiàn (上海市人民政府关于本市开展碳排放交易试点工作的
实施意见) [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government to Carry out the Implementation of Views on the
City’s Carbon Emissions Trading Pilot], http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/
node12344/u26ai32789.html.
210
Ranping Song & Hongpeng Lei, Emissions Trading in China: First Reports from the Field,
WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/emissions-trading-china-first-reports-field.
211
See, e.g., Shanghai Municipal People’s Government to Carry out the Implementation of Views on
the City’s Carbon Emissions Trading Pilot, supra note 208.
212
“Emissions Intensity”—Pollution by Any Other Name?, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, (Aug. 23,
2005), http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/fintensity.asp.
213
Id.
214
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan promised to “reduce the political influence of large
Japanese corporations and to establish an ambitious climate policy,” and the Basic Law on Global
Warming Countermeasures, passed in May 2010, called for the creation of a national emissions trading
system. However, it proved impossible to overcome industry concerns over international competitiveness
without meaningful international action on climate change, so the legislation lapsed and the Fukushima
disaster sealed its fate. Plans for a national, mandatory emissions trading system were formally abandoned
in November 2012. See TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 22; SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note
163, at 7; Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1-3; Shanahan, supra note 174.
215
Rudolph & Schneider, supra note 174, at 5-6.
216
Id. at 6-7.
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Tokyo’s mandatory municipal emissions trading system still allocates
permits to emitters for free.217
In New Zealand, the steady decline and low price of emissions units
reflects the low constraints imposed by their emissions trading system.218
Under “transitional measures” that were extended indefinitely in 2012,219
participants may purchase carbon units from the government at a fixed price
and those in the energy, industrial, and liquid fuel sectors need surrender
only one credit for every two tons of emissions produced.220 Industries
facing international competition, horticulture, and fishing receive up to 90%
free allocation.221 In the industrial sector, the percentage allocated for free
was initially 90% for highly emissions-intensive activities and 60% for
moderately emissions-intensive activities.222 This free allocation for large
emitters was set to decline by 1.3% per year starting in 2013,223 but the 2012
amendment postponed these cuts indefinitely, “effectively lock[ing] in the
ninety percent allocation subsidy.”224
South Korea’s trial emissions trading system will transition to a
national scheme in 2015, with significant concessions to emitters.225 At least
95% of permits will be allocated for free in the first and second commitment
periods, and at least five percent will be auctioned.226 This is similar to the
217

TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19; BUREAU OF THE ENV’T, TOKYO METRO. GOV’T,
TOKYO CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: JAPAN’S FIRST MANDATORY EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 19 (Mar.
2010), available at http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_trade_programmarch_2010_TMG.pdf.
218
Keys Defends NZ’s ETS Amid Criticism, FINANCIAL REV. (July 11, 2011),
http://www.afr.com/p/national/politics/keys_defends_nz_ets_amid_criticism_9XA1ATGHI1GuFHtffxF1A
J (noting that when Australia announced a carbon tax/fixed-price period that would force Australian
polluters to pay $23 per ton of CO2-e, New Zealand’s credit price was $9.77, and noting that Green Party
leaders expressed concern over the cost of subsidizing carbon pollution); TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra
note 100, at 13.
219
TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 13.
220
Id. at 12.
221
Newell et al., supra note 114, at 130.
222
SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 164, at 3-4.
223
Id.
224
Addendum to the Submission on the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other
Matters) Amendment Bill, Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee, Dr. Jan Wright, Sept.
2012, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 5-6, available at http://www.pce.parliament.nz/
assets/Uploads/PCE-Submission-on-the-Climate-Change-Amendment-Bill.pdf (observing that under the
original phase-out period, polluters would still be responsible for only half of their emissions by 2050;
under the 2012 amendments, this phase-out is postponed indefinitely).
225
South Korea initially announced an emissions trading bill in 2011 with significant concessions to
industry, including free permit allocation and easing non-compliance penalties. NORTON ROSE, supra note
130, at 1. Nevertheless, South Korea’s two largest business lobbies, the Federation of Korean Industries
and Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry, successfully lobbied to delay introduction of the emissions
trading system for another four years—until 2015. Sangim Han, supra note 185.
226
Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Permits, May 14, 2012,
Addenda art. 2 (S. Kor.).
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EU ETS’s ratio when it was launched in 2005.227 In reality, emitters will
likely receive all of their allowances for free during the first commitment
period, 2015 to 2017, and as much as 97% free from 2018 to 2020.228
Moreover, the system will likely exempt certain key emissions-intensive and
trade-exposed industries from the reduction in free allocations for the first
two phases.229 Companies in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors
will receive all of their allowances free.230
Each of these emissions trading systems allocates the vast majority of
permits to emitters for free. This substantially diminishes the financial
burden on emitters, giving them less incentive to reduce emissions. The
next section describes the use of offsets in these systems. Offsets, combined
with the free allocation, could mean that a majority of emitters could comply
with the regulations without making a single emissions reduction.
b.

These emissions trading systems are flawed to the extent that they
permit the use of offsets

Finally, because the emissions trading systems of Australia, China,
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea include offsets, these systems will
likely be environmentally ineffective. In Australia, domestic carbon credits
may be used to meet five percent of a regulated entity’s compliance
obligation during the fixed price period.231 After July 1, 2015, there are no
limits imposed on the amount of domestic offsets used.232 Regulated entities
cannot use internationally sourced credits during the fixed charge years,233

227

Tom Young, The Ultimate Guide to South Korea’s Cap-and-Trade Scheme, BUSINESSGREEN
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/2044996/ultimate-guide-south-koreas-captrade-scheme. The EU ETS is poised to become significantly more demanding with only 40% of permits
allocated free of charge from 2013. Id.
228
MINISTRY OF ENV’T, ENVTL. REV. 2013, KOREA: ECOREA 30 (2013), available at
http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/index.do?menuId=30&findDepth=1.
229
Korea’s Emission Trading Scheme Receives Cabinet Approval, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Nov. 26,
2012), http://bakerxchange.com/rv/ff000c93476c98a4f4e26731fb45a94f3e29f762. The concept of
protecting “trade exposed” industries arose when countries contemplating climate legislation became
concerned that industries with high compliance costs would be unable to compete in the international
market against their foreign counterparts who had less stringent climate legislation. See Emissions Trading
and the WTO, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, http://www.ieta.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=54:3-minute-briefing&id=206:emissions-tradingand-the-wto (last visited May 8, 2014).
230
SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 9, at 3.
231
Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) part 6, div. 3, subdiv. A §125(7) (Austl.); Explanatory Memorandum,
supra note 204, at 117.
232
House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 204, at 117.
233
Clean Energy Act 2011, supra note 231, at part 6 div. 1 §121.
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but they may use the credits to meet up to 50% of their compliance
obligation in the first five floating price years.234
In China, regulated entities may use carbon credits, Chinese Certified
Emission Reductions, 235 to offset a limited portion of their compliance
obligation. All Chinese pilot programs have agreed to accept these credits,
with limits. 236 China’s national emissions trading system will likely
incorporate offsets, as well.237
Japan is heavily reliant on offsets, as opposed to emissions
reductions, to meet its emissions targets, as demonstrated by the extensive
incorporation of offsets in both its municipal and national emissions trading
programs. Under the Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program, small and midsized
facilities can generate tradable offset credits, with no limit for offsetting.238
Under JVETS, entities can also use CDM credits without limit, so long as
they are not the “primary means” of achieving the pledged targets.239 The
J-VER scheme, established in 2008, is a verification scheme for credits
generated through the reduction or recapture of greenhouse gases carried out
via domestic projects.240 This scheme and the domestic CDM system241
were integrated into a new J-Credit Scheme.242 Projects are eligible under
234

Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 74.
Wēnshì qìtǐ zìyuàn jiǎnpái jiāoyì guǎnlǐ zànxíng bànfǎ (温室气体自愿减排交易管理暂行办法) [The
Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China] (promulgated by the
National Development and Reform Commission July 2012), available at http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/
WebSite/CDM/UpFile/File2894.pdf (authorizing voluntary emission reductions from qualified projects to
be traded as Certified Emission Reductions and used to offset compliance obligations. One Certified
Emission Reduction equals one ton of CO2e).
236
SWARTZ, supra note 103, at 16. Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hubei, and Guangdong
have limited or are expected to limit use of offsets to 10% of emissions reduction requirements. Id. at 5;
CARBON MARKET WATCH, CHINA’S PILOT EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS (NEWSLETTER #3) (May 30,
2013), available at http://carbonmarketwatch.org/chinas-pilot-emissions-trading-systems/.
237
See, e.g., NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, supra note 143.
238
YUKO NISHIDA, BUREAU OF ENV’T, TOKYO METRO. GOV’T, TOKYO CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM &
STRATEGIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 14, available at http://www.unep.org/
sbci/pdfs/Oct_symposium/Metropolitan's%20Tokyo's%20Cap%20and%20Trade%20Program_YN.pdf.
239
JP-2: Japanese Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS), INDUS. EFFICIENCY POL.
DATABASE, http://iepd.iipnetwork.org/policy/japanese-voluntary-emissions-trading-scheme-jvets.
240
See generally MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, OFFICE OF MKT. MECHANISMS, CLIMATE CHANGE POL.
DIVISION,
OFFSET
CREDIT
(J-VER)
SCHEME
(2011),
available
at
http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech/j-ver_scheme.pdf (including reductions and forest sinks).
This is a system utilizing the mechanism of carbon offsets, under which the amount of reduction/removal
by sinks of greenhouse gas emissions carried out by domestic projects is certified as credits for offsetting.
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., FINAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTION OF THE NEW CREDIT SYSTEM
(2012), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2012/0802_01.html.
241
The domestic CDM system is a system whereby large enterprises provide technology and capital
and validate the emissions reductions achieved through projects implemented by small and medium-sized
enterprises in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries, the private sector (business and households),
and the transportation sector. Large enterprises in Japan use this system to meet their voluntary action plan
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the J-Credit scheme if they are implemented within Japan, satisfy
additionality, and ensure permanency—a particular challenge for forestry
credits.243
Uniquely, Japan has established a Joint Crediting Mechanism/Bilateral
Offset Credit Mechanism, a program under which Japan exports low carbon
technologies to, and implements pollution mitigation actions in, developing
countries to generate emissions reductions, or credits, which can be used to
achieve Japan’s emission reduction target.244 Japan modeled this on the UN
CDM: it relies on bilateral agreements between Japan and developing
countries whereby Japanese investors can fund emissions reduction projects
in partner countries to generate emissions credits. 245 Japan signed
agreements with Bangladesh, Vietnam, Mongolia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Laos,
and Indonesia.246
New Zealand’s system lacks quantitative limits on offsets. 247
Unlimited NZUs may be purchased from the forestry sector and Kyoto
flexibility mechanisms.248 Until May 31, 2015, an unlimited amount of
international Kyoto units can be purchased by participants in the emissions
trading system and surrendered to meet obligations.249 Regulated entities
may also use UN CERs to meet their entire emissions reduction
requirement.250 As a result of this unrestricted use of offsets, the majority of
credits submitted under the New Zealand emission trading system have been
disproportionately ERUs, RMUs, and CERs, as opposed to fixed price
243
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allowances.251 Additionally, a 2012 amendment enables pre-1990 forest land
owners to participate in an offsetting mechanism: they may avoid incurring
liability for deforestation if new forest is established elsewhere.252
The South Korea system permits offsetting with credits generated by
CDM projects located in Korea from the start.253 Companies under the ETS
will not be allowed to use international offsets through 2020.254 Starting in
2021, however, regulated entities can use international offsets to meet at
least ten percent of a liable entity’s surrender obligations, but the volume
must not exceed the number of domestic offsets used.255 Simultaneously,
the government is allocating as much as 97% of a company’s emission
allowances for free between 2018 and 2020, and 90% after 2021.256
Therefore, the emissions trading systems of Australia, China, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea have three fundamental flaws. First, they
allocate emission allowances free of cost to specific emitters. Free
allocation artificially prolongs the use of fossil fuels by reducing the
incentives for regulated entities to reduce emissions and shifting the cost of
emissions reductions to the taxpayer. Second, because allocation is often
based on incomplete or self-reported historical emissions data, there is a
substantial risk that inaccurate or manipulated data will result in surplus
allowances. 257 When such over-allocation occurs, meaning the total
emissions cap is set far higher than actual emissions, total emissions may
actually increase under an emissions trading system, and fossil fuel intensive
industries receive windfall profits.258 Third, regulated entities are permitted
to use offsets to meet their emissions reduction requirements. These offsets
allow regulated entities to emit pollution above the cap, relying on credits
that may or may not represent actual emissions reductions, and perpetuates
reliance on fossil fuels. While each of these factors alone should discourage
251
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countries from relying on emissions trading systems to reduce emissions,
they are symptomatic of the larger, crucial shortcoming of emissions trading
systems: the prioritization of economic interests over environmental results
and the assumption that human-induced climate change can be solved
without relinquishing our dependence on fossil fuels.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Carbon emissions trading systems will not lower carbon dioxide
emissions to safe levels. The degree of legal, institutional, and technological
investment required to implement and administer such systems undermines
their alleged efficiency and delays implementation. The inadequacy of data
on carbon emissions and sinks, which is particularly pronounced for the
forestry and agricultural sectors, undermines the effectiveness of these
systems and makes measuring, monitoring, and verifying emissions and
emissions credits costly. It also limits the coverage of emissions trading
systems to large facilities in a few sectors, making emissions trading an
incomplete solution to climate change at best. Finally, the practice of
allocating allowances for free and permitting the use of offsets has the effect
of artificially prolonging and even legitimizing the use of fossil fuels, while
allowing regulated parties to increase emissions. The emissions trading
systems along the Pacific Rim will only ensure continued investment in
fossil fuel technologies and economies, distracting policymakers from the
substantial and systemic changes that might actually slow climate change.

